

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS**

DONALD MASCIO )  
                    )  
Plaintiff,       )  
                    )  
vs.               ) CIVIL NO. 08-cv-107-WDS  
                    )  
C/O PRIDDY, RAY ALLEN, C/O HENRY )  
and F O U R U N K N O W N )  
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS,       )  
                    )  
Defendants.       )

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

**STIEHL, District Judge:**

Plaintiff, formerly an inmate in the Menard Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

- (a) **Screening.**— The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
- (b) **Grounds for Dismissal.**— On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—
  - (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
  - (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Upon careful review of the complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A; portions of this action are thus subject to summary dismissal.

## **CLAIM 1**

Plaintiff alleges that on March 19, 2007. Defendant Priddy and the four unknown officer defendants came to his cell and verbally harassed him. They then pulled his arms through the chuckhole, causing pain and bleeding.

The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate without penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under Section 1983. *Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992); *DeWalt v. Carter*, 224 F.3d 607, 619 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 6-7. An inmate seeking damages for the use of excessive force need not establish serious bodily injury to make a claim, but not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. . . . [the] prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” *Id.* at 9-10; *see also Outlaw v. Newkirk*, 259 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Applying these standards, the Court is unable to dismiss this excessive force claim at this time.

Plaintiff then alleges that these same defendants refused to take him for medical treatment. The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). This encompasses a

broader range of conduct than intentional denial of necessary medical treatment, but it stops short of “negligenc[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition.” *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 106. *See also Jones v. Simek*, 193 F.3d 485, 489 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Steele v. Choi*, 82 F.3d 175, 178 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), *cert. denied*, 519 U.S. 897 (1996).

Although his allegations are sketchy, the Court is unable to dismiss this medical care claim at this time.

Finally, stemming from this same incident, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Henry wrote a “bogus” disciplinary ticket against him. In that ticket, he was charged with damaging property, intimidation, insolence, and disobeying a direct order. He was found guilty and punished with three months in segregation, three months at C-grade, and one month of yard restriction (see Exhibit A).

When a plaintiff brings an action under § 1983 for procedural due process violations, he must show that the state deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or property” without due process of law. *Zinermon v. Burch*, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). An inmate has a due process liberty interest in being in the general prison population only if the conditions of his or her confinement impose “atypical and significant hardship...in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted an extremely stringent interpretation of *Sandin*. In this Circuit, a prisoner in disciplinary segregation at a state prison has a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population only if the conditions under which he or she is confined are substantially more restrictive than administrative segregation at the most secure prison in that state. *Wagner v. Hanks*, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). If the inmate is housed at the most restrictive prison in the state, he or she must show that disciplinary segregation there is substantially more restrictive than administrative

segregation at that prison. *Id.* In the view of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, after *Sandin* “the right to litigate disciplinary confinements has become vanishingly small.” *Id.* Indeed, “when the entire sanction is confinement in disciplinary segregation for a period that does not exceed the remaining term of the prisoner’s incarceration, it is difficult to see how after *Sandin* it can be made the basis of a suit complaining about a deprivation of liberty.” *Id.*

In the case currently before the Court, Plaintiff was sent to disciplinary segregation for three months. Nothing in the complaint or exhibits suggests that the conditions that he had to endure while in disciplinary segregation were substantially more restrictive than administrative segregation in the most secure prison in the State of Illinois. Therefore, Plaintiff’s due process claim is without merit, and this claim against Defendant Henry is dismissed with prejudice.

## **CLAIM 2**

Plaintiff alleges that on April 11, 2007, while he was being transported, Defendant Allen refused to turn on the heat in the bus or provide him with a coat, thus causing him to suffer from the cold.

Prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to adequate shelter, including a right to protection from cold. *See Dixon v. Godinez*, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). To assess whether cold cell temperatures constitute cruel and unusual punishment, courts must consider factors including “the severity of the cold; its duration; whether the prisoner has alternative means to protect himself from the cold; the adequacy of such alternatives; as well as whether he must endure other uncomfortable conditions as well as cold.” *Id.* at 644; *see also Palmer v. Johnson*, 193 F.3d 346 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1999); *Henderson v. DeRobertis*, 940 F.2d 1055, 1058 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff does not state to where he was being transported on that date, but apparently he was

either leaving or returning to Menard. The Court has reviewed the historical weather data for that part of the state on the date in question; the temperature that day ranged from a low of 46°F to a high of 62°F.<sup>1</sup> Clearly this temperature range does not constitute severe cold. Although Plaintiff may have been uncomfortable during his bus ride, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, Claim 2 is dismissed from this action with prejudice.

### **CLAIM 3**

In his final claim, Plaintiff alleges that on July 27, 2007, unspecified individuals placed him in a cell where the windows were covered with steel plates, and the temperature reached over 100°. In addition, the cell “was nasty,” yet unspecified officials refused to provide him with cleaning supplies. Neither would they take him to the barber, the library, or the exercise yard.

The Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Not all prison conditions trigger Eighth Amendment scrutiny, only deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical safety. *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981); *see also James v. Milwaukee County*, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992). In order to prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy the objective and subjective components applicable to all Eighth Amendment claims. *McNeil v. Lane*, 16 F.3d 123, 124 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); *see also Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991). The objective component focuses on the nature of the acts or practices alleged to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. *Jackson v. Duckworth*, 955 F.2d 21, 22 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992). The objective analysis examines whether the conditions of confinement exceeded contemporary

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<sup>1</sup> The Court found this information on Weather Underground, [http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KSAR/2007/4/11/DailyHistory.html?req\\_city=Chester&req\\_state=IL&req\\_statename=Illinois](http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KSAR/2007/4/11/DailyHistory.html?req_city=Chester&req_state=IL&req_statename=Illinois) (accessed June 9, 2008).

bounds of decency of a mature civilized society. *Id.* The subjective component of unconstitutional punishment is the intent with which the acts or practices constituting the alleged punishment are inflicted. *Jackson*, 955 F.2d at 22. The subjective component requires a prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. *Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 298; *see also McNeil*, 16 F.3d at 124.

Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding the subjective component of his claim. More fatal to this claim, though, is that Plaintiff makes no allegations against any *specific* defendant. Therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Claim 3 is dismissed from this action with prejudice.

#### **DISPOSITION**

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that CLAIM 2 and CLAIM 3 are **DISMISSED** with prejudice in their entirety. Further, **the due process claim against Allen in CLAIM 1** is also **DISMISSED** with prejudice.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Defendants ALLEN and HENRY are **DISMISSED** from this action with prejudice.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff shall complete and submit a USM-285 form for defendant PRIDDY within **THIRTY (30) DAYS** of the date of entry of this Memorandum and Order. The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to send Plaintiff ONE (1) USM-285 forms with Plaintiff's copy of this Memorandum and Order. **Plaintiff is advised that service will not be made on a defendant until Plaintiff submits a properly completed USM-285 form for that defendant.**

The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to prepare Form 1A (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons) and Form 1B (Waiver of Service of Summons) for Defendant PRIDDY. The Clerk shall forward those forms, USM-285 forms submitted by Plaintiff, and sufficient copies

of the complaint to the United States Marshal for service.

The United States Marshal is **DIRECTED**, pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to serve process on Defendant **PRIDDY** in the manner specified by Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Process in this case shall consist of the complaint, applicable forms 1A and 1B, and this Memorandum and Order. For purposes of computing the passage of time under Rule 4(d)(2), the Court and all parties will compute time as of the date it is mailed by the Marshal, as noted on the USM-285 form. Service shall not be made on the Unknown Defendants until such time as Plaintiff has identified them by name on a USM-285 form and in a properly filed amended complaint. Plaintiff is **ADVISED** that it is Plaintiff's responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service addresses for these individuals.

With respect to former employees of Illinois Department of Corrections who no longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the Department of Corrections shall furnish the Marshal with the Defendant's last-known address upon issuance of a court order which states that the information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service (or for proof of service, should a dispute arise) and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Marshal. Address information obtained from I.D.O.C. pursuant to this order shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal.

The United States Marshal shall file returned waivers of service as well as any requests for waivers of service that are returned as undelivered as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service is not returned by a defendant within **THIRTY (30) DAYS** from the date of mailing the request for waiver, the United States Marshal shall:

- Request that the Clerk prepare a summons for that defendant who has not yet returned a waiver of service; the Clerk shall then prepare such summons as

requested.

- Personally serve process and a copy of this Order upon the defendant pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 566(c).
- Within ten days after personal service is effected, the United States Marshal shall file the return of service for the defendant, along with evidence of any attempts to secure a waiver of service of process and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service on said defendant. Said costs shall be enumerated on the USM-285 form and shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal's office for photocopying additional copies of the summons and complaint and for preparing new USM-285 forms, if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served defendant in accordance with the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) unless the defendant shows good cause for such failure.

Plaintiff is **ORDERED** to serve upon defendant or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon that attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by this Court. He shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to defendant or his counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

Defendants are **ORDERED** to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this cause is **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter is hereby **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), *should all the parties consent to such a referral.*

Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed

of any change in his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven (7) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

Plaintiff is advised that the dismissal of some claims from action counts as one of his three allotted “strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See George v. Smith*, 507 F.3d 605, 607-08 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007); *Boriboune v. Berge*, 391 F.3d 852, 855 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004)

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

**DATED: June 11, 2008.**

**s/ WILLIAM D. STIEHL**  
**DISTRICT JUDGE**